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FRIEND OR FOE OF THE U.S. LABOR
MARKET: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD RAISE
OR ELIMINATE THE H-1B VISA CAP
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 2 and April 3, 2007, the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Service (USCIS) received over 123,000 applications from
employers seeking to hire H-1B (specialty) workers in the United States. 1
The H-1B visa category is a “vehicle through which qualified aliens may
seek admission to the United States on a temporary basis to work in their
fields of expertise.” 2 It allows U.S. employers, mainly information
technology (IT) companies, to recruit and hire foreign workers possessing
special skills and training for up to six years. 3 Because Congress has
implemented a 65,000 annual cap on admission of H-1B workers in the
United States, 4 April 2 and 3, 2007 were the first and only days the USCIS
accepted applications for H-1B workers for fiscal year 2008. 5
Because the number of applications exceeded the congressionally
mandated cap of 65,000, the USCIS was forced to create a lottery, 6 leading
to the rejection of thousands of timely submitted applications. 7 As a result
of the immediate fulfillment of the cap, many U.S. employers were unable
to hire employees with sufficient training and experience to meet their
needs. 8 Furthermore, many aliens, residing in the United States and
attending U.S. educational institutions in anticipation of being placed in
U.S. jobs, have been and will be forced to leave the country when their F
and J educational visas expire. 9 Finally, companies that experience labor
1. Robert Pear, High-Tech Titans Strike Out on Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2007,
at 1. Also note that April 1, 2007 was a Sunday and thus acceptance of applications did not begin
until April 2.
2. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS OF SPECIALTY OCCUPATION WORKERS (H-1B):
FISCAL YEAR 2005 (2006), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/
H1B_FY05_Characteristics.pdf [hereinafter 2005 H-1B CHARACTERISTICS].
3. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1184(g)(4) (2009).
4. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1184(g)(1)(A)(vii) (2009).
5. Pear, supra note 1. See also Arnold Schwarzenegger et al., Governor Schwarzenegger
Leads Multi-State Push for Immigration Reform to Protect Skilled Workforce, STATE NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 11, 2007.
6. Chris O’Brien, How many H-1B workers? Counts vary, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July
15, 2007, at Science and Tech Section (“[T]he immigration service conducts a lottery to award the
visas.”).
7. Hilary Potkewitz, Professional Visas Sell Out on First Day, CRAIN’S NEW YORK
BUSINESS.COM, Apr. 4, 2007, http://www.newyorkbusiness.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=
/20070404/FREE/70404007/1064/newsletter01.
8. See discussion infra Part VI.
9. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Services and Benefits: Student Visas, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid
=27bc6138f898d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=48819c7755cb9010VgnV
CM10000045f3d6a1RCRD (“The ‘F’ visa is reserved for nonimmigrants wishing to pursue
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shortages later in the year will not be able to obtain sufficiently skilled
workers until the next fiscal year, even if they are diligent enough to submit
their applications on time. 10
The legitimacy of the H-1B cap and of the H-1B visa category as a
whole has been an issue since 1990 when Congress first implemented the
cap. 11 Until 2004, Congress had taken the necessary steps to increase and/or
decrease the cap according to the anticipated annual demands for H-1B
workers throughout the U.S. labor force. 12 For example, after the cap was
exhausted for fiscal year 13 1998, Congress raised the cap to 115,000 for
fiscal year 1999. 14 In 2000, during the IT boom, Congress increased the cap
again to 195,000 for fiscal years 2001−2003. 15 However, since 2004,
Congress has refused to increase the 65,000 cap, despite the growing labor
demand for H-1B workers. 16 For fiscal years 2004−2007, H -1B application
academic studies and/or language training programs.”); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Services and Benefits:
Exchange Visitors, available at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919
f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=a4ac6138f898d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgne
xtchannel=48819c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD (“The ‘J’ visa is for educational
and cultural exchange programs designated by the Department of State, Bureau of Consular
Affairs.”).
10. Stuart Anderson, Should Congress Raise the H-1B Cap?, Testimony of Stuart Anderson,
Executive Director: National Foundation for American Policy before the House Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims (Mar. 30, 2006) at 3, available at
http://www.nfap.com/researchactivities/articles/Testimony033006.pdf (“Even when new hires are
not lost, waiting several months for key personnel is expensive and can cost firms dearly in the
marketplace.”); H-1B Professionals and Wages: Setting the Record Straight, NATIONAL
FOUNDATION
FOR
AMERICAN
POLICY
(Mar.
2006)
at
2,
available
at
http://www.nfap.com/researchactivities/articles/NFAPPolicyBriefH1BProfessionalsAndWages03
06.pdf [hereinafter NFAP, Setting the Record Straight] (“In recent years, Congress has failed to
increase sufficiently the annual limit on H-1B visas for foreign-born professionals, regularly
leaving U.S. companies unable to hire key personnel for many months.”).
11. See Norman Matloff, On the Need for Reform of the H-1B Non-Immigrant Work Visa in
Computer-Related Occupations, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 815 (2003) [hereinafter Matloff, On
the Need for Reform].
12. See sources cited infra notes 14–19.
13. Senate.gov, Glossary - “Fiscal Year,” http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/
fiscal_year.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2009) (defining “fiscal year” as “the accounting period for the
federal government which begins on October 1 and ends on September 30. The fiscal year is
designated by the calendar year in which it ends.”).
14. Charles Gordon, Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, 2-20 IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 20.04, at 1 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 2008). See also Steven A. Clark &
Vincent W. Lau, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE MANUAL § 5.1.5 (Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., Inc.,
2004).
15. Gordon, Mailman & Yale-Loehr, supra note 14, at 1. See also Clark & Lau, supra note 14.
But see Carolyn Lochhead, Immigration Bill Would Add Visas for Tech Workers, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 10, 2006. While this Note does not focus on the political reasons for Congress refusing to
increase the cap, Lochhead notes that “with the high tech crash and the revelation that some of the
Sept. 11, 2001 hijackers had entered the country on student visas, the political climate for foreign
workers darkened, and Congress quietly allowed the number of H-1B visas to plummet back to
65,000 a year.” Id.
16. Gordon, Mailman & Yale-Loehr, supra note 14, at 1.
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submissions reached the cap on February 18, 2004, November 23, 2004,
August 10, 2005 and May 26, 2006, respectively, moving closer to the
opening date of April 1. 17 In 2007, H-1B applications reached the cap for
fiscal year 2008 on the first day H-1B season opened, April 2, 2007. 18
These statistics clearly show that, while the demand for H-1B visas has
continued to increase since 2003, Congress refuses to adjust the cap to meet
the demands of the labor force. 19
Critics and advocates of the H-1B program “have staked out seemingly
irreconcilable positions” on increasing the cap and the H-1B program in
general. 20 Critics question the existence of a labor shortage in the IT
sector 21 and contend that the system displaces American workers from U.S.
jobs. 22 They assert that the program lacks proper administrative
safeguards, 23 allowing U.S. employers to abuse the system and mistreat
non-citizens. 24
Meanwhile, supporters of the H-1B program and a cap increase argue
that the program enables the United States to remain competitive in the
global economy, 25 and prevents the off-shoring of U.S. jobs to other
countries. 26 These advocates argue three main points on the state of the
labor market. First, that there is truly a shortage of highly skilled workers as
evidenced by the annual demand for H-1B visas. 27 Second, that there is no
fixed number of jobs available in the U.S. labor market, and both
compensation and the availability of jobs are based on other factors within
17. Id.
18. See Potkewitz, supra note 7 (noting that USCIS accepted applications on April 2 and April

3 because the statute requires the acceptance period to last at least two days).
19. See Indian IT Companies to Acquire More US Firms, PRESS TR. INDIA, Aug. 15, 2007
(noting that the H-1B cap is not “likely to be raised from the current ceiling of 65,000 anytime
soon”).
20. Todd H. Goodsell, On the Continued Need for H-1B Reform: A Partial, Statutory
Suggestion to Protect Foreign and U.S. Workers, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 153, 154 (2007).
21. See generally Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11.
22. See Simone M. Schiller, Does the United States Need Additional High-Tech Work Visas or
Not? A Critical Look at the So-Called H-1B Visa Debate, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
645, 650 (2001) (“H-1B workers are taking jobs from Americans and giving them to foreigners.”).
See also John Miano, Testimony of John Miano before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border
Security, and Claims, House Judiciary Committee (Mar. 23, 2006) at 1 [hereinafter Miano,
Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration] (“After eleven years, Congress has yet to close
the loophole allowing direct replacement of U.S. workers by H-1B workers.”).
23. Miano, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 22 at 1
(“Congress has established the labor certification process as a ‘rubber stamp’ operation that has no
value . . . . The data collection and reporting are not adequate to monitor the H-1B program.”).
24. See generally Norman Matloff, Debunking the Myth of a Desperate Software Labor
Shortage, Testimony to the U.S. House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Immigration (Apr.
21, 1998) at Sec. 9.2–9.4, available at http://heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/itaa.real.html [hereinafter
Matloff, Debunking the Myth] (discussing problems with prevailing wage difficulties in
enforcement and indentured servitude).
25. See discussion infra Part VI.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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the labor market, 28 thus making the shortage debate moot. Finally, that
preventing foreigners, especially foreign students enrolled in colleges and
universities in the United States, from entering the U.S. workforce, is
“detrimental to our economic success in the future because we will lose
valuable intellectual capital.” 29
This Note argues that the current cap of 65,000 is inadequate for the
present U.S. labor force and that the existence of the cap itself is an
inappropriate and unnecessary element of the H-1B category. Part II of this
Note describes the H-1B category, its requirements and the safeguards
implemented by Congress to protect U.S. and foreign workers. Part III
examines the legislative history of the H-1B category as well as its current
state. Part IV addresses the leading arguments made by critics who oppose
raising the H-1B visa cap. Part V lays out some of the most compelling
arguments for increasing or abolishing the cap entirely and explains why
industries other than the IT sector are suffering due to the H-1B cap.
Finally, Part VI of this Note sets forth the most logical solutions for
reforming the H-1B category.
II. WHAT IS THE H-1B VISA CATEGORY?
The H-1B visa category, designed to bring the world’s “best and
brightest” 30 to the United States, is an employment-based nonimmigrant
visa “that allows skilled aliens in certain ‘specialty occupations’ to work in
the United States.” 31 The USCIS defines “specialty occupation” as “an
occupation that requires (a) theoretical and practical application of a body
of highly specialized knowledge, and (b) attainment of a bachelor’s or
higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for
entry into the occupation in the United States.” 32 Employers are “required
to pay H-1B workers either the same rate as other employees with similar
skills and qualifications or the ‘prevailing wage’ for that occupation and
location, whichever is higher.” 33 The initial stay for an H-1B worker in the
United States is three years but can be extended to a maximum of six
years. 34 While the H-1B category applies across a wide spectrum of
professions and benefits citizens of a broad range of nations, approximately
28. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 12–13.
29. Michael R. Traven, Restricting Innovation: How Restrictive U.S. Visa Policies Have the

Potential to Deplete our Innovative Economy, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 693, 695 (2006).
30. Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 818.
31. Jung S. Hahm, American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998:
Balancing Economic and Labor Interests Under the New H-1B Visa Program, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1673, 1674 (2000).
32. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1184(i)(1) (2009).
33. John Miano, The Bottom of the Pay Scale: Wages for H-1B Computer Programmers, CTR.
FOR IMMIGR. STUD., Dec. 2005, at 1, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back1305.html
[hereinafter Miano, The Bottom of the Pay Scale]. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n).
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4).
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40% of H-1B visas approved each year are in computer-related
occupations, 35 and approximately 42% of the H-1B workers entering the
United States each year come from India. 36
The H-1B visa category is important to the U.S. labor market because
of the long regulatory delays for green cards. 37 Such delays “make it
virtually impossible to hire an individual directly on a green card,” 38 and
without availability of the H-1B visa, “skilled foreign nationals, particularly
graduates of U.S. universities, could not work or remain in the United
States.” 39 The H-1B category also permits dual intent, meaning that,
contrary to various other nonimmigrant visa categories, H-1B workers
coming to work in the United States are not required to avow their intent to
leave the United States once their visa has expired. Rather, dual intent
permits H-1B workers to pursue avenues for permanent residence. 40
One of the main critiques of the H-1B visa category is that it promotes
or allows the displacement of U.S. workers from employment. 41 In order to
curb this risk, Congress has implemented various safeguards to protect U.S.
workers. Some of the safeguards include the annual cap, a requirement for
each applying employer to file a Labor Condition Application (LCA) with
the Department of Labor (DOL), the designation of employers as “H-1B
dependent” and the addition of various fees to the application process. 42
III. HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF THE H-1B
VISA CAP
The H-1B category was established through the Immigration Act of
1990. 43 It was a spin-off of the previous H-1 category and was designed to

35. 2005 H-1B CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 2, at 2; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS OF
SPECIALTY OCCUPATION WORKERS (H-1B): FISCAL YEAR 2004 (2006), at 2, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/H1B_FY04_Characteristics.pdf; U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS OF
SPECIALTY OCCUPATION WORKERS (H-1B): FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2004), at 2, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/FY03H1BFnlCharRprt.pdf.
36. Id.
37. NFAP, Setting the Record Straight, supra note 10, at 3. See also USCIS.gov, Processing
Times, https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/jsps/ptimes.jsp. Green Card visa processing times for
employment-based immigration range from 2–5 years depending on where the employer is
located. The process is two parts: I-140 Applications must be approved and then I-485
applications are filed when a visa becomes available. The processing time for I-140 Applications
filed at either the Texas or Nebraska Service Center is approximately 16 months and I-485
processing time varies between 18 and 30 months.
38. NFAP, Setting the Record Straight, supra note 10, at 3.
39. Id.
40. Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 815.
41. See discussion infra Part IV.
42. See discussion infra Part III.
43. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, REPORT ON H-1B PETITIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2005, ANNUAL REPORT
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“make conditions for granting the visa more precise; add some protections
for the domestic workforce; and allow dual-intent status so that employers
could simultaneously sponsor the worker for a green card.” 44 The
protections implemented for the domestic workforce included capping the
amount of H-1B visas issued annually at 65,000 (subject to increases by
Congress) and requiring every applying employer to file an LCA with the
DOL. 45
During the high-tech boom of the 1990s, an industry association known
as the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) produced a
series of statistical reports “asserting burgeoning gaps and shortages of
information-technology workers” in the American workforce. 46 The United
States Department of Commerce affirmed the findings of these reports in
1997. 47 Despite criticism, the release of the ITAA reports, along with
various other publications claiming a labor shortage, convinced the Clinton
administration to enact the America Competitiveness and Workforce
Improvement Act of 1998 (ACWIA 98). 48 The ACWIA 98 temporarily
increased the cap for fiscal year 1999 to 115,000 and also implemented
further safeguards to protect American workers. 49
Specifically, the ACWIA 98 created a new employer category called
“H-1B dependent” employers, who employ workforces consisting of at
least 15% H-1B workers. These employers are subject to more intensive
regulations and penalties. ACWIA 98 requires H-1B dependent employers
to make a good faith effort to recruit U.S. workers “using procedures that
meet industry-wide standards and offering compensation that is at least as

(2006), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/H1B05Annual_08_7.pdf
[hereinafter 2005 USCIS H-1B ANNUAL REPORT].
44. Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 818.
45. Id. at 819.
46. Michael S. Teitelbaum, Do We Need More Scientists?, THE PUBLIC INTEREST 42 (2003).
See generally Help Wanted: The IT Workforce Gap at the Dawn of a New Century, Information
Technology Association of America, Arlington, Virginia, 1997, available at
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/16/8e/
3e.pdf; Help Wanted 1998: A Call for Collaborative Action for the New Millenium, Information
Technology Association of America and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Mar.
1998, available at http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/lazowska/press/itaa/WFRpt2.doc.
47. See America’s New Deficit: The Shortage of Information Technology Workers, Office of
Technology Policy, U.S. Department of Commerce (1997), chart at 3, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3797/is_199802/ai_n8804905 (asserting that “between
1994 and 2005 over one million new computer scientists, engineers, systems analysts, and
programmers would be required” to fill 820,000 newly created jobs and replace 227,000 workers
leaving the fields). See also Enid Trucios-Haynes, Immigration Symposium: Temporary Workers
and Future Immigration Policy Conflicts: Protecting U.S. Workers and Satisfying the Demand for
Global Human Capital, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 967, 1006 (2002).
48. See 2005 USCIS H-1B ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 1; Matloff, On the Need for
Reform, supra note 11, at 824–25.
49. Gordon, Mailman & Yale-Loehr, supra note 14, at 1. See also Clark & Lau, supra note 14.
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great as that required to be offered to H-1B nonimmigrants . . . .” 50
Additionally, such employers “must also not have conducted layoffs of
American workers for a certain period before filing an H-1B petition, and
must not do so for another time period after filing.” 51 Finally, the ACWIA
98 also created the H-1B Nonimmigrant Petitioner Fee account “to fund
training and education programs administered by the Department of Labor
and the National Science Foundation.” 52
In addition to enacting regulations to protect U.S. workers, the ACWIA
98 mandated certain federal administrative agencies to perform studies to
keep Congress apprised of the domestic labor demand. Specifically,
ACWIA 98 requires the Attorney General to notify Congress, on a quarterly
basis, of the number of aliens issued H-1B visas during the preceding three
months and to issue annual reports specifying the countries of origin and
occupations of, educational levels attained by, and compensation paid to, H1B employees. 53 Further, the ACWIA 98 mandated the National Academy
of Sciences to conduct (1) a study “assessing the status of older workers in
the information technology field” and (2) a study over the course of the
subsequent ten years assessing the “labor market needs for workers with
high technology skills.” 54 Despite these measures, none of these mandates
have been properly complied with, with the exception of the National
Academy of Sciences ten-year report due sometime in 2009. 55
In anticipation of the projected increase in the U.S. workforce’s demand
for foreign specialty workers, Congress expanded the H-1B category even
further with the American Competitiveness Act of 2000 (ACA) and the
untitled Public Law 106-311. 56 The ACA temporarily increased the H-1B

50. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, div. C, tit. IV, 412(a) (Title IV of this act is known as the American Competitiveness
and Workforce Improvement Act) [hereinafter ACWIA 98]. See also Matloff, On the Need for
Reform, supra note 11, at 825.
51. David C. Yang, Globalization and the Transnational Asian “Knowledge Class”, 12 ASIAN
L.J. 137 (2005), citing Hahm, supra note 31, at 31.
52. 2005 USCIS H-1B ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 1. See also ACWIA 98, supra note
50 at 414(b). Employers were required to pay a fee of $500 for each H-1B application to be put
into the account for the purposes of training U.S. workers and for low-income scholarship
programs, grants for mathematics, engineering and science enrichment courses, reform activities
and duties on petitions. Id.
53. 2005 USCIS H-1B ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 1. See also ACWIA 98, supra note
50 at 414(b).
54. Id.
55. 2005 USCIS H-1B ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 1 (noting that the Attorney
General’s quarterly reports for 2002–2005 were not provided until 2006 due to “the transition to
the Department of Homeland Security”). Also, it is unlikely that the Academy of Sciences will
issue a timely report because no such study is listed on the Academy of Sciences’ website as
pending. See generally http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
56. See 2005 USCIS H-1B ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43 at 1; Matloff, On the Need for
Reform, supra note 11, at 826.
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cap to 195,000 for fiscal years 2001−2003. 57 In addition to the cap increase,
the ACA added a number of other provisions to the H-1B category: (1)
exempting foreign workers employed at an institution of higher education
or nonprofit entity from the cap; 58 (2) increasing portability opportunities
for H-1B workers to switch employers during their tenure in the United
States; 59 and (3) allowing extensions of H-1B status beyond the six-year
limit while such alien’s permanent residence application is being
adjudicated. 60 In addition, to further protect U.S. workers, Public Law 106311 raised the H-1B Nonimmigrant Petitioner Fee from $500 to $1,000. 61
Various additional regulations have passed since the ACA, but none
have increased the cap. In December 2004, Congress passed the Omnibus
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005, which included the H-1B Visa
Reform Act of 2004 (RA 2004), raising the H-1B Nonimmigrant Petitioner
Fee to $1,500 and implementing a new Fraud Prevention and Detection Fee
of $500 with each new H-1B application. 62 The RA 2004 also added an
exemption to the H-1B cap for 20,000 additional H-1B visas for aliens who
earn a master’s degree or higher from a U.S. institution. 63 In addition to the
65,000 cap for regular H-1Bs, the cap for fiscal year 2008 for an additional
20,000 aliens earning master’s degrees or higher from U.S. universities was
reached on April 30, 2007. 64
In 2005, a number of bills were proposed to Congress seeking to
implement further safeguards to protect American and foreign workers.
Examples include the Defend the American Dream Act of 2005 (DADA), 65
and the USA Jobs Protection Act of 2005 (JPA). 66 The DADA proposed to
set more definite guidelines for wage determination, 67 a stricter notice
requirement for employers seeking H-1B employees, 68 an increase in the

57. American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-313,
114 Stat. 1251, 2000 Enacted S. 2045, 106 Enacted S. 2045 (Oct. 17, 2000), at 102 (amending 8
U.S.C. 1184(g)(1)(A)).
58. Id. at 103 (amending 8 U.S.C. 1184(g)).
59. Id. at 105 (amending 8 U.S.C. 1184). Portability permits H-1B workers to move to another
H-1B qualifying employer during the pendency of their H-1B stay in the United States. Id. See
generally Gordon, Mailman & Yale-Loehr, supra note 14 (noting that portability allows H-1B
employees to switch employers during the pendency of their stay in the United States).
60. American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, supra note 57 at 106
(amending 8 U.S.C. 1184(g)(4)).
61. Nonimmigrant Worker Visa Fee Increase, 106 Pub. L. 311, 114 Stat. 1247, 2000 Enacted
H.R. 5362 (Oct. 17, 2000).
62. Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 209, div. J, tit. IV, 426(a)
(Dec. 8, 2004); 2005 USCIS H-1B ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43 at 1.
63. Allocation of Additional H-1B Visas Created by the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004, 70
Fed. Reg. 23,775 (May 5, 2004) at 23,776.
64. O’Brien, supra note 6.
65. H.R. 4378, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 17, 2005).
66. H.R. 3322, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 18, 2005).
67. H.R. 4378, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 17, 2005) at Sec. 2.
68. H.R. 4378, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. at Sec. 4.
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petition fee 69 and creation of a private right of action for U.S. workers
displaced by H-1B employees. 70 The JPA sought to “prevent unintended
United States job losses” and to “increase the monitoring and enforcement
authority of the Secretary of Labor” over the H-1B and other immigration
programs. 71 Neither bill passed Congress. 72
In July 2006, Congress considered the American Innovation and
Competitiveness Act for enactment. 73 Buried in this expansive immigration
bill were provisions “nearly doubling the H-1B skilled-worker temporary
visas to 115,000 − with an option of raising the cap 20 percent more each
year.” 74 This bill never became law and was referred to a congressional
committee. 75 In June 2007, the Senate submitted S. 1639, a comprehensive
immigration reform bill known as The Secure Borders, Economic
Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (IRA 2007) to the
floor. 76 Among other immigration reforms, the IRA 2007 proposed
increasing the cap to 115,000 for fiscal year 2008 and to 180,000 after
that. 77 In exchange for the cap increase, the bill proposed several
restrictions on the H-1B program. First, it proposed eliminating “dual
intent” for H-1B non-immigrants, preventing H-1 workers and their
employers from seeking permanent residence status while in the United
States. 78 Second, it proposed subjecting all employers to burdensome rules
currently applied only to “willful violators” or H-1B dependent
employers. 79 Such regulations would include requiring employers to make
substantial efforts to locate U.S. workers with the necessary skill sets to fill
the position. 80 Finally, IRA 2007 proposed the implementation of a $5,000
“training fee” for each H-1B application. The “training fee” funds were to

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at Sec. 8.
Id. at Sec. 10.
H.R. 3322, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 18, 2005).
GovTrack.us, H.R. 4378 [109th]: Defend the American Dream Act of 2005,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-4378 (confirming the bill was never passed
and was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims
on Feb. 6, 2006); GovTrack.us, H.R. 3322 [109th]: USA Jobs Protection Act of 2005,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-3322 (confirming the bill was never passed
and was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims
on Aug. 23, 2005).
73. GovTrack.us, S. 2802 (109th): American Innovation and Competitiveness Act of 2006,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-2802.
74. Lochhead, supra note 15.
75. GovTrack.us, S. 2802 (109th): American Innovation and Competitiveness Act of 2006,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-2802.
76. Stephen Yale-Loehr and Ted J. Chiappari, The Senate Immigration Reform Bill: The Case
of the Twitching Toe, 12-13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 9 (July 1, 2007), appearing in N.Y.L.J.,
June 25, 2007.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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be allocated for educating and training U.S. workers. 81 The bill never
became law. 82
In somewhat of a response to the defeat of IRA 2007, in August 2007
Congress passed, and President Bush signed into law, the America Creating
Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology,
Education, and Science Act (Competes Act), 83 which authorized “funding
of $43.3 billion . . . for [science, technology, engineering, and mathematics]
research and education programs at the federal level, including scholarship
and grant programs.” 84 The Competes Act was viewed as addressing the
“long term challenges of building the pipeline for tech talent, although
changes in immigration policies, including increasing the cap on H-1B
visas, would help U.S. tech employers tackle the short term skills gap.” 85
While the Competes Act aims to meet the long-term challenges of the
shortage of IT workers, it is unlikely to work in the short term; thus, U.S.
employers still call for an increase in the cap. 86
Recent reports and studies continue to document the increasing need for
IT workers in the United States workforce. Specifically, the DOL publishes
an annual Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH) listing U.S. job
positions, describing the education requirement, average earnings, and job
outlook in the field. 87 For computer/technology related fields in 2006−2007,
the OOH listed the outlook for most categories as expecting to increase
“much faster than average.” 88 Furthermore, the DOL lists software
publishers, scientific and technical consulting services, and computer
81. Id.
82. S. 1639, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 29, 2007); GovTrack.us, AGjobs Act of 2007,

http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1639 (Noting that as of October 20, 2007,
“this bill is in the first stage of the legislative process where the bill is considered in committee
and may undergo significant changes in markup sessions.”).
83. The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology,
Education, and Science Act, H.R. 2272, 110th Cong. (Aug. 9, 2007).
84. Congress Pushes for More Tech Education, R&D Programs, TECHWEB, Aug. 2, 2007.
85. Id. (internal citations omitted).
86. Id. at 84.
87. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook
2008/2009, www.bls.gov (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
88. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook
2008/2009: Computer Software Engineers, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos267.htm#outlook (last
visited Jan. 4, 2009); Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook 2008/2009:
Computer
Support
Specialists
and
Systems
Administrators,
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos268.htm#outlook (last visited Jan. 4, 2009); Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook 2008/2009: Computer Systems
Analysts, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos287.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2009); Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook 2008/2009: Computer Scientists and
Database Administrators, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos042.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). But see
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook 2008/2009:
Computer Programmers, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos110.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
Computer Programmer is the only computer-related occupation where job growth is expected to
be lower than average. Id.
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systems design and related services in its top ten industries with the fastest
wage and salary employment growth for 2004−2014. 89
While the hype has quieted since the enactment of the Competes Act,
interest groups will continue to mobilize, attempting to influence Congress
for the next proposed immigration reform bill. Meanwhile, the U.S. labor
market is suffering at the hands of the H-1B cap, 90 putting U.S. jobs at risk
to off-shoring 91 and putting the United States in danger of losing its most
valuable resource in the twenty-first century, intellectual capital. 92
IV. DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN INCREASE IN THE
CAP AND AGAINST THE H-1B VISA CATEGORY IN
GENERAL
A. THE LABOR SHORTAGE
One of the leading arguments against the H-1B category is that the IT
industry’s “claim of a desperate labor shortage [is] invalid and was devised
to hide the industry’s real goal − to use the H -1B program as a source of
cheap labor.” 93 Various software experts have published studies and have
appeared before Congress to support their claims that no labor shortage
exists. 94
In order to refute the IT industry’s “labor shortage” claims as
unreliable, critics refer to various other studies conducted around the time
the ITAA reports were released. 95 However, the studies cited by critics
point mainly to methodological problems in the data and analysis of the
ITAA reports, rather than actually providing data counter-indicative of the
89. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Industries With the Fastest Growing
Wage and Salary Employment Growth, 2004-14, http://www.bls.gov/emp/empfastestind.htm (last
visited Jan. 4, 2009).
90. See discussion infra Part V.
91. See discussion infra Part V.B.
92. See discussion infra Part V.A.
93. See generally Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 816 (arguing that the
central issue behind the IT Industry’s claims of the shortage is money). See also Trucios-Haynes,
supra note 47, at 967; Teitelbaum, supra note 46.
94. See Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 833. See also Matloff, Debunking
the Myth, supra note 24.
95. See generally Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 833–39 (citing a study by
economist Robert Lerman, “pointing out various methodological problems in the ITAA report” at
835; a paper by Bureau of Labor Statistics researcher Carolyn Veneri, pointing out problems with
the ITAA’s analysis of its data at 835–36; a statement by the Department of Commerce (DOC) in
1999, reversing its position on the conclusiveness of the ITAA data at 836; a 1999 report issued
by The Computer Research Association (CRA), noting additional “problems with the analyses of
unemployment rates” at 836; a 2000 congressionally-commissioned National Research Counsel
Report (NRC), noting a “‘tightness’ rather than a ‘shortage’” in the IT labor market at 839; an
analysis by the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, expressing a “general puzzlement at
the lack of good indicators in the data of a shortage” but noting that the industry’s claim was made
in good faith at 839; and the IT Workforce Data Project, “a four-part series on the IT labor force,”
“finding that one could not conclude from the data that there was a shortage” at 837–38).
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ITAA conclusions. 96 In addition, proponents of the H-1B visa contend that
the debate regarding the labor shortage is irrelevant because “the number of
jobs available in America is not a static number . . . .” 97 Rather, the labor
market grows “based on several factors, including labor force growth,
technology, education, entrepreneurship, and research and development.” 98
Thus, prohibiting an increase in the entrance of highly skilled workers in
the IT sector stifles the growth of that industry for both foreign and native
workers.
Critics also claim that the apparent labor shortage is actually a result of
U.S. employers’ “pickiness.” 99 They assert that IT employers “have no
shortage of incoming resumes,” 100 that only approximately 2% of applicants
actually are hired, 101 and that most employers reject a majority “of the
applicants they invite for in-house interviews.” 102 While IT companies
admittedly are selective, 103 certain IT positions require particular skill
sets. 104 Without certain training or skills required by the position, an
applicant will not be considered for it. Critics argue that, “good generic
programming ability, not skills in particular programming languages, is
what counts,” 105 and that “workers are available, but not always at a price
employers are willing to pay.” 106 On the other hand, it seems unfair to place
the burden and expense on employers to train under-qualified employees in
the specific skill sets required for the position when there are workers
available who are already trained. The issue is an ongoing circular debate.
B. PAYING H-1B WORKERS THE PREVAILING WAGE
Critics assert that IT companies pay foreign workers less than
comparable American workers. 107 They occasionally refer to a 2004 report
by John Miano for the Center on Immigration Studies (CIS Report), which
asserts that wages paid to H-1B workers in computer programming
occupations are significantly lower than wages paid to U.S. workers in the

96. Id. See also Trucios-Haynes, supra note 47, at 1007. The NRC Report “found that there is
no formula to adopt the necessary number of H-1B visas.” A 1999 study by the National Science
Foundation “found that there is no adequate information to answer the question of whether there is
a shortage of information technology workers, but only inferential information.” Id.
97. NFAP, Setting the Record Straight, supra note 10, at 3.
98. Id. at 3–4.
99. Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 843.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 845.
102. Id. at 844 and Tables 2 and 3.
103. Id. at 845 (“When asked [the author’s] citing of a low 2 percent hiring rate, Microsoft
admitted that it is ‘very, very selective.’”).
104. Id. at 846.
105. Id. at 864.
106. Id. at 847.
107. Id. at 816.
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same occupation and state. 108 Specifically, the CIS Report asserts that the
difference between wages paid to U.S. workers and wages paid to H-1B
workers in fiscal year 2004 was over $18,000 per worker, on average. 109
The CIS Report notes that some of the largest IT companies in the United
States paid their H-1B workers much less than the prevailing wage,
including Motorola ($19,584), EMC Corporation ($15,004), eBay
($14,493) and IBM ($12,681). 110
However, the CIS Report is misleading for a number of reasons. First,
the data utilized in this report does “not reveal what employers actually pay
individuals on H-1B visas.” 111 The CIS Report data was taken from the
LCAs filed with the Department of Labor in 2003. However, the wage data
provided by employers on LCAs does not necessarily reflect what salary the
H-1B holder actually receives. 112 Rather, the prevailing wage reported on
the LCA is a “minimum requirement and is usually lower than what the H1B visa holder actually receives,” 113 making the CIS Report inherently
flawed. 114 For example, when employers complete the wage amount
question on the LCA application, they may fill in the number that is the
current prevailing wage as listed in the OOH, rather than the wage that they
will actually pay the employee. Second, many of the other big name
employers do, in fact, pay their workers “the premium wages one would
expect for ‘highly skilled workers.’” 115 For example, Apple is listed as
paying its H-1B workers over $19,000 higher than the U.S. prevailing
wage, with Sun Microsystems, Intuit and Qualcomm not far behind.116
Third, these statistics do not strengthen the argument that employers abuse
the system intentionally. Rather, the real problem lies with the law’s
ineffectiveness in ensuring that H-1B workers are paid the prevailing
wage. 117 Finally, various studies contradict critics’ findings of abuse and
find, rather, that most employers pay H-1B workers more than U.S.

108. Miano, The Bottom of the Pay Scale, supra note 33, at 6.
109. Id. See also, Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 22, at

10.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 22, at 13–14 Table 2.
NFAP, Setting the Record Straight, supra note 10, at 9.
See id.
Id.
Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 22, at 13–14 Table 2.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 13, Table 2.
See Miano, The Bottom of the Pay Scale, supra note 33, at 8. See discussion on the LCA
infra Section V. See also Susan Martin, B. Lindsay Lowell & Phillip Martin, U.S. Immigration
Policy: Admission of High Skilled Workers, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 619, 632 (2002) (referring to
Lindsay Lowell, Information Technology Companies and U.S. Immigration Policy: Hiring
Foreign Workers, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, SCHOOL OF
FOREIGN
SERVICE,
GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY
(2000),
available
at
http://riim.metropolis.net/Virtual%20Library/2000/wp00S4.pdf. Studies show that “employers
are, by and large, good actors and their need for highly skilled foreign workers is legitimate.” Id.
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workers. 118 Such studies take into account factors such as age, 119 the
benefits H-1B workers receive, and the expenditures U.S. employers incur
in obtaining the H-1B visa. 120 In addition, even though H-1B workers are
not from the United States, they “are still smart people,” and “if
[employers] try to fool with them,” these workers can and will simply go
elsewhere because of the labor demand. 121 Therefore, the assertion that U.S.
employers are “taking advantage” of foreign H-1B workers is simply not
reasonable.
C. DISPLACEMENT OF AMERICAN WORKERS
Critics also argue that H-1B workers displace American workers, 122
especially older workers, women and minorities. 123 “Older workers are
perceived as being more expensive than younger ones,” 124 and thus “when
employers exhaust the supply of young American workers, they turn to
hiring younger H-1Bs in lieu of older Americans.” 125 Some companies
acknowledge that while “they would prefer to hire an American to avoid the
paperwork and lawyer’s fees involved in sponsoring a foreign worker’s
visa,” some managers “don’t hire many Americans because recruiting them
is time consuming; most of the resumes they receive from their human
resources department[s] are for foreign workers.” 126
Yet Congress has implemented a number of safeguards in the H-1B
visa category to prevent displacement of U.S. workers. One example is the
ACWIA 98 legislation, 127 wherein Congress directed the National Research
Council to study this issue of displacement of older American workers.128
The report, released in late 2000, confirmed that “older IT workers indeed
faced major obstacles in finding work in the field, even during boom
times.” 129 Congress has made attempts to curb the H-1B effect on older

118. NFAP, Setting the Record Straight, supra note 10, at 5 (referring to research by Paul E.
Harrington, associate director for the Center for Labor Market Studies at Northeastern University).
119. See id. at 5–7.
120. Id. at 6–7 and Table 1.
121. Hahm, supra note 31, at 1697 n.170 (quoting “a foreign-born engineer who interviews
prospective hires”).
122. Schiller, supra note 22, at 650.
123. Carrie Kirby, On the Sidelines; H-1B Leaves Minority Workers on Sidelines, Groups Say,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 2000 at B1 (“Many African Americans, Latinos, women, older workers and
other groups underrepresented in the high-tech industry say the H-1B program . . . is shortcircuiting their opportunities.”).
124. Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 887.
125. Id.
126. Kirby, supra note 123, at B1.
127. ACWIA 98, supra note 50.
128. See id. at 656; see also Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 826.
129. Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 826.

2009]

Friend or Foe of the U.S. Labor Market

469

workers by funding the training of older American workers in the
technology field with an extra fee imposed on H-1B visa applications. 130
In addition, there is evidence that “failure to raise the H-1B ceiling is
what will deprive Americans of jobs in the high-tech industry.” 131 A
number of the largest IT firms in the United States employing U.S. and
foreign workers such as Sun Microsystems, 132 Google, 133 Intel, 134 Oracle
and Computer Associates were either partly or totally founded by
foreigners. 135 For example, “James Gosling, a Canadian national, developed
the Java platform that transformed computer software development.” 136
Non-U.S. employers create thousands of jobs in the United States, thus
weakening the correlation between immigration and displacement of U.S.
workers.
D. BODY SHOPPING
Critics argue that many U.S. employers abuse the H-1B program,
specifically with the use of “body shopping.” Body shopping is the name
given to the practice whereby placement agencies bring H-1B visa workers
into the United States and “then contract the workers out to other
companies on a work-for-hire basis, in an attempt to avoid statutory wage
requirements.” 137 The advantage of body shopping for employers is that
they can pay the employees lower wages by allowing the contracting
employer to claim it never hired any H-1B workers, and the body shopping
company to say it never fired any U.S. employees. 138 While body shopping
is a large problem in the United States for various reasons discussed more
fully below, body shopping is likely a result of, rather than a justification
for, the cap.
There are a multitude of problems with the practice of body shopping.
“[B]ody shops circulate lists of available H-1B workers to employers,
placing them in direct competition with U.S. workers seeking similar
jobs.” 139 Body shopping also leads to abuse of foreign workers. For
example, since companies contract out their H-1B workers, sometimes not
all of the workers have work assignments. Instead of paying the workers the
130. ACWIA 98, supra note 50, at 652; see also Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note
11, at 825. It is argued, however, that this plan failed because the money was used to train workers
in alternate fields. Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 826.
131. Schiller, supra note 22, at 650.
132. Id. at 651.
133. Traven, supra note 29, at 693.
134. Anderson, supra note 10, at 1.
135. See Editorial, Review and Outlook: Jobs and Immigrants, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2005, at
A12.
136. Schiller, supra note 22, at 651.
137. Goodsell, supra note 20, at 156.
138. Id. at 168. See also Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note
22, at 17.
139. Miano, The Bottom of the Pay Scale, supra note 33, at 4.
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prevailing wage as they are required to do, body shopping agencies “bench”
the H-1B workers by not paying them or “pay[ing] them a reduced rate
when they have no actual work.” 140 In addition, body shopping adds to the
problem of displacement of U.S. workers 141 because the H-1B workers are
paid lower wages and are thus more attractive to employers.
Some studies claim that the top twenty H-1B employers in the United
States, with the exception of Oracle, are body shoppers. 142 In addition, the
same studies estimate that two-thirds of the H-1B workers “in computer
programming occupations are going to employers in the . . . [body
shopping] industries.” 143 If body shopping is actually as prevalent as some
critics assert, then body shopping employers frustrate the aims of the H-1B
program by abusing foreign workers, displacing U.S. workers and using up
much needed visas otherwise available for legitimate employment
positions. Thus, those opposing an increase in the visa cap argue that by
banning the practice of body shopping or limiting the number of H-1B visas
a single employer can have, a great majority of visas will open up, quashing
the necessity of increasing the cap. 144
Instead, however, the H-1B cap may be the cause of body shopping in
the United States, and if the cap is abolished, the practice of body shopping
will likely decline or disappear altogether. In 2003, once the cap reverted to
65,000 from 195,000, 145 employment placement agencies and consulting
firms such as MindTree and Wipro, two of the largest body shoppers, began
“scrambling to build teams of visa-ready people.” 146 They were forced to
anticipate what skills their clients would need in the next few years and thus
make efforts to mobilize enough H-1B visas to “manage a supply imbalance
that was expected to emerge . . . .” 147 Thus, the 65,000 cap created a high
demand for H-1B visas, which led employment and recruiting agencies to
obtain as many H-1B workers as possible for themselves and their
clients. 148 In turn, as a result of these agencies hoarding H-1B visas, it is
likely that the abusive body shopping practices developed because the
140. Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 22, at 18.
141. Id. at 18.
142. Goodsell, supra note 20, at 168 (citing Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on

Immigration, supra note 22). These body shopping companies include Wipro Ltd., Infosys
Technologies, Syntel, HPS America, IBM Global Service India, Tata Consultancy Services,
Satyam Computer Services, Patni Computer Systems, Mphasis Corporation, Intelligroup,
eBusiness Application Solutions, iGate Mastech, HCL Technologies America, Tata Infotech,
Enterprise Business Solutions, Cognizant Technology Solutions, Rapidigm, IntelliQuest Systems
and Jags Software. Id.
143. Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 22, at 9.
144. Goodsell, supra note 20, at 171.
145. Saritha Rai, Cap on U.S. Work Visas Puts Companies in India in a Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
1, 2003 at W1.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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agencies could not afford to pay H-1B workers who were not assigned to
jobs. Therefore, raising or abolishing the cap will reduce the pressure to
mobilize a supply of H-1B visas, thus eliminating the practice of body
shopping altogether.
E. PROBLEMS WITH THE LCA
The LCA is the principal means through which the Department of
Labor “regulates” the H-1B visa category. The avowed purpose of the LCA
process is to assist the employer in determining whether “there ‘are not
sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified . . . and available’ and
that the employment of the non-citizen ‘will not adversely affect the wages
and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly
employed.’” 149 Many critics argue that the current LCA system “is grossly
inefficient and, at worst, irrational” 150 because it is not sufficient to
accomplish its purpose. 151 Further, critics argue that the LCA “does not tell
what happens beyond the labor condition process,” and thus is inadequate
to monitor and protect H-1B workers once they disappear into the U.S.
interior. 152
Prior to filing its H-1B petition, the U.S. employer must undergo a fourstep labor certification process in order to sufficiently complete the LCA.
The first and most troubling step of the labor certification process is to
establish the wage requirement for the position to be filled and to
acknowledge that the employer will pay the H-1B employee the required
wage rate. 153 The “wage rate” is defined as “the greater of the actual wage
rate . . . or the prevailing wage . . . .” 154 One of the greatest criticisms of the
LCA is the way “wage rate” is defined in the statute. 155 The statutory
definition of “actual wage” is the “rate paid by the employer to all other
individuals with similar experience and qualifications for the specific
employment in question. In determining such wage level, the following
factors may be considered: experience, qualifications, education, job
responsibility and function, specialized knowledge, and other legitimate
business factors.” 156 To determine the prevailing wage,
the employer shall base the prevailing wage on the best information as of
the time of filing the application . . . . [T]he employer is not required to
use any specific methodology to determine the prevailing wage and may
149. Trucios-Haynes, supra note 47, at 979–80 (citing IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(i) (2000).
150. Trucios-Haynes, supra note 47, at 986.
151. See generally id.
152. Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 22, at 6.
153. 20 C.F.R. 655.731 (2009).
154. 20 C.F.R. 655.731(a) (2009).
155. See generally Miano, The Bottom of the Pay Scale, supra note 33.
156. 20 C.F.R. 655.731(a)(1) (2009).
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utilize a [state employment service agency], an independent authoritative
source, or other legitimate sources of data. 157

Allowing an employer to base its determination of wage on either the
wage amount paid to similar employees or by the “best information,”
without requiring any “specific methodology,” gives employers too much
freedom in designating the wage rate for the position. 158 Studies show that
the value of prevailing wages claimed in LCA applications is not
representative of the actual prevailing wage of a given occupation.159
Further, there is no actual person evaluating the employer’s asserted wage
rate. 160 Thus, only if the employee makes a complaint will the wage rate be
subject to scrutiny. 161
The remaining requirements of an employer under the labor condition
process include that the employer assert: (1) “that the employment of H-1B
non-immigrants will not adversely affect the working conditions of workers
similarly employed in the area of intended employment;” 162 (2) that “there
is not at that time a strike or lockout in the course of a labor dispute in the
occupational classification at the place of employment;” 163 and (3) that “the
employer has provided notice of the filing of the labor condition application
to the bargaining representative of the employer’s employees . . . or, if there
is no such bargaining representative, has posted notice of filing in
conspicuous locations in the employer’s establishment(s) in the area of
intended employment . . . .” 164 Again, like the determination of the wage
rate, the LCA requires only a statement by the employer of the truthfulness
of the application. 165 There is no administrative review of any of the
statements until a complaint of abuse is made. 166 Further, unless the
employer is an H-1B dependent, there is no requirement that the employer
make any attempt to recruit U.S. workers for the position. 167 Many of the
problems asserted by critics of the H-1B visa, including failure of
employers to pay the prevailing wage, 168 displacement of U.S. workers for
157. 20 C.F.R. 655.731(a)(2) (2009) (emphasis added).
158. Miano, The Bottom of the Payscale, supra note 33, at 15 (“Employers should be required

to use a standard wage source produced by the federal government when making prevailing wage
claims for LCAs. Allowing employers to pick from nearly any wage source is not a valid measure
of the prevailing wage.”).
159. Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 22, at 10–11.
160. Miano, The Bottom of the Payscale, supra note 33, at 4 (“Unfortunately, the LCA system
has been nothing more than a paper-shuffling process. The Department of Labor does not actually
verify the data within an LCA or make approval judgments based upon its contents.”).
161. Kirby, supra note 123, at B1 (“The Department of Labor does not verify the salary
information on visa applications unless a complaint is filed.”).
162. 20 C.F.R. 655.732 (2009).
163. 20 C.F.R. 655.733 (2009).
164. 20 C.F.R. 655.734 (2009).
165. Miano, The Bottom of the Payscale, supra note 33, at 4.
166. Kirby, supra note 123, at B1.
167. See Goodsell, supra note 20, at 159.
168. See discussion, supra Part IV.B.
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lower paid H-1B employees 169 and abuse by body shopping agencies, 170 are
a result of the failure of the LCA system to act as a safeguard. As a result,
the LCA process is in dire need of reform, and any H-1B reform legislation
will need to include LCA reforms in addition to an increase in the cap.
V. SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS FOR INCREASING THE CAP
In addition to the high demand for workers, proponents remind us that
the H-1B visa enables the world’s best and brightest to come to the United
States, allowing it to maintain its status as a leading innovative economy. 171
“In today’s knowledge-based economy, capturing value from intellectual
capital and knowledge-based assets has gained even more importance.
Global competition is no longer for the control of raw materials, but for this
productive knowledge.” 172 If the cap remains at 65,000 and companies are
not able to hire the workers they need, there will be severely detrimental
effects on the U.S. economy. More companies will begin off-shoring their
operations to more immigration-friendly nations such as Canada, Germany
and the United Kingdom, or to countries where labor is less expensive.173
Furthermore, fewer foreign nationals will enroll in U.S. universities because
they will have no hope of remaining in the United States after graduation.174
While all agree that the H-1B category needs reform, proponents argue that
the protections mandated by the USCIS are taken seriously and that critics
over-exaggerate the abuse of the category. 175
A. THE LOW CAP DEPRIVES THE U.S. OF MUCH-NEEDED
INNOVATIVE TALENT
Proponents of raising the cap argue that preventing foreign students
who attend U.S. universities from accepting positions in the United States
“will be detrimental to our economic success because the United States will
169. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
170. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
171. Deborah Rothberg, H-1B Increase Quietly Passes First Hurdle, EWEEK, May 31, 2006,

http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1969617,00.asp (quoting Bill Gates referring to a 2006
Immigration Reform Bill that was passed by the Senate but not the House, “By passing
comprehensive immigration reform legislation today that makes prudent adjustments to the annual
H-1B visa and green card caps for high skilled employees, the U.S. Senate has taken a critical step
forward in its important work to ensure that our nation remains the global leader in technology
innovation.”).
172. Vivek Wadhwa et al., Intellectual Property, the Immigration Backlog, and a Reverse
Brain-Drain: America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Part III (Sponsored by the Duke
University School of Engineering, New York University, Harvard Law School and Ewing Marion
Kauffman Foundation) (Aug. 2007) at 2 [hereinafter Wadhwa et al., America’s New Immigrant
Entrepreneurs].
173. See discussion infra Part V.B.
174. Anderson, supra note 10, at 2 (“[T]he availability of H-1B visas is important, otherwise
skilled foreign nationals, particularly graduates of U.S. universities, could not work or remain in
the United States.”).
175. See generally NFAP: Setting the Record Straight, supra note 10.
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lose valuable intellectual capital.” 176 Some allege that U.S. visa policies,
specifically Congress’s refusal to raise the H-1B cap, “are primarily to
blame for the decline in international student enrollment in U.S. academic
institutions.” 177 Thousands of foreign students enter the United States each
year on F, M and J visas to attend U.S. universities. 178 Not only is their
attendance at these universities beneficial to the economy by injecting
capital through tuition and living expenses, 179 but their creative ideas are
also crucial to our modern economy, which focuses on innovation. 180 The
cap prevents many of these graduating students from being placed in jobs in
the United States, forcing them to return to their home countries. 181 Thus,
“instead of maximally retaining foreign talent . . . U.S. immigration policies
have expelled such individuals back to their home countries, where they
have contributed to local workforces’ ability to compete on a national basis
with the [United States].” 182
In addition to the loss of a well-educated workforce, the H-1B cap
prevents the United States from being credited for the innovation of
valuable intellectual property. In 2006, foreign nationals residing in the
United States filed 25.6% of the international patent applications. 183
“Foreign nationals and foreign residents contributed to more than half of the
international patents” filed by multi-national companies such as Qualcomm,
Merck & Co., General Electric, Siemens and Cisco in 2006. 184 Furthermore,
“41% of the patents filed by the U.S. government had foreign nationals or
foreign residents as inventors or co-inventors.” 185 In addition, 16.8% and
13.7% of international patent applications from the United States had an
inventor or co-inventor with a Chinese or Indian-heritage name,
respectively. 186 Finally, one study shows that “for every 100 international
students who receive science or engineering Ph.D.’s from American
universities, the nation gains 62 future patent applications.” 187 It is clear

176. Traven, supra note 29, at 695.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 697 (“A significant number of students attending U.S. universities, both in

undergraduate and graduate programs, are international students. In the 2002–2003 school year
alone, nearly 600,000 foreign students were enrolled in U.S. academic institutions.”).
179. See generally id. at 698–99. See also id. at 713 (F and M student visas) and 715–17 (J
exchange visitor visas).
180. Id. at 701 (“The number of workers in the creative class is directly related to the
importance that the U.S. economy has placed on creativity.”).
181. See Review and Outlook, supra note 135.
182. Yang, supra note 51, at 154.
183. Wadhwa et al., America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs, supra note 172, at 3.
184. Id. at 4.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Stuart Anderson, The Debate Over Immigration’s Impact on U.S. Workers and the
Economy, NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR AMERICAN POLICY (July 2006) (citing Gnanajaraj
Chellaraj, Keith E. Maskus, and Aiditya Matoo, The Contribution of Skilled Immigration and

2009]

Friend or Foe of the U.S. Labor Market

475

from these statistics that the U.S. economy is dependent on the innovative
ideas of foreigners. “‘Economists worry about another place owning the
very next big thing’ – the next ground breaking technology . . . . ‘If the
heart and mind of the next great thing emerges somewhere else because the
talent is there, then we will be hurt.’” 188 If the H-1B cap remains at this
current unsatisfactory level, it will prevent the admission of foreign workers
with new ideas. 189
B. OFF-SHORING
Proponents of the H-1B visa argue that the visa cap threatens to set the
United States behind in innovation and science and actually increases
layoffs of U.S. workers because it encourages off-shoring. 190 If employers
in the United States cannot hire foreign workers with the experience and
training required, “then companies who are trying to remain globally
competitive are left with only one solution: shifting those operations offshore.” 191 Many U.S. companies “concede that the uncertainty created by
Congress’ inability to provide a reliable mechanism to hire skilled
professionals has encouraged placing more human resources outside the
United States to avoid being subject to legislative winds.” 192
While the practice of off-shoring began mainly with the working class,
commonly with apparel workers, and then moved into areas like customer
service (as with American Express), a number of IT industry leaders such as
IBM have begun the practice of off-shoring some of their technical support
positions and software jobs. 193 Companies are finding that “knowledgebased endeavors,” such as technical support positions and software jobs,
“require relatively little overhead costs beyond a basic telecommunications
infrastructure.” 194 Moreover, information-based productive activities
involve far less complex issues of coordination by virtue of the ability of

International Graduate Students to U.S. Innovation (Mar. 17, 2005)), available at
http://www.nfap.com/researchactivities/studies/EDO0706.pdf.
188. June Kronholz, Under a Cloud: For Dr. Sengupta, Long-Term Visa Is a Long Way Off —
Rules Limit Entry, Prospects Of Foreign-Born Scientists Despite Demand for Them — Latest in
Weather Satellites, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2006, at A1 (quoting Dan Siciliano, Stanford University
economist).
189. See generally Traven, supra note 29.
190. See generally Tracy Halliday, Current Public Law and Policy Issues: The World of
Offshoring: H-1B Visas Can be Utilized to Curb the Business Trend of Offshoring, 25 HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & POL’Y 407 (2004).
191. Id. at 426.
192. NFAP, Setting the Record Straight, supra note 10, at 3. See also Hahm, supra note 31, at
1692 (“This uncertainty and confusion [of visa caps arbitrarily determined by the legislature
failing to accurately predict the needs of the industry] will inevitably result in the high-tech firms
moving overseas, closer to the ready source of skilled human capital.”).
193. Halliday, supra note 190, at 408–09.
194. Yang, supra note 51, at 153.
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work products to “move unencumbered by the limits of time and space as
bits and pixels in global communication networks.” 195
Most recently, Microsoft Corp. announced the plan to open a large
software development center in Vancouver to enable it to “recruit and retain
highly skilled people affected by immigration issues in the [United
States].” 196 The stated benefits for companies engaging in off-shoring are
plentiful and include cheaper labor (which benefits consumers), economic
efficiency and the ability to bring new job opportunities to third world
nations. 197 However, off-shoring has many disadvantages including the loss
of American jobs, which forces more people into unemployment and hurts
the U.S. economy. 198 Other disadvantages include the risk of abuse of
workers in foreign countries who are forced to work for low wages 199 and
most relevant, the risk of the United States “losing its leading role in
innovation.” 200 If the cap remains low, then foreigners who make up a
significant portion of U.S. university science graduates, and “who have
been extremely helpful to U.S. technological success” will no longer be
able to come to the United States with their creative and innovative ideas,201
thus depriving the United States of the vital brain power needed to remain a
leading intellectual influence in the global realm.
As more and more U.S.-educated foreign students are forced to leave
the United States after graduation for lack of available visas, they return to
their home countries, which become “attractive locales for off-shoring.” 202
The cap on the H-1B visa “has resulted in a highly educated class of
knowledge workers in Asian countries that is acculturated to U.S. business
195. Id.
196. Todd Bishop, Microsoft Plans to Open Software Center in B.C., SEATTLE POST-

INTELLIGENCER, July 6, 2007 at 1.
197. Halliday, supra note 190, at 414–15.
198. Id. at 416.
199. Id. at 418.
200. Id. at 418.
201. Id. at 419.
202. Yang, supra note 51, at 154. But see Wadhwa et al., America’s New Immigrant
Entrepreneurs, supra note 172, at 2. Adding to the off-shoring problem is that “the number of
skilled workers waiting for visas [green cards] is significantly larger than the number that can be
admitted to the United States. This imbalance creates the potential for a sizeable reverse braindrain from the United States to the skilled workers’ home countries.” Id. Therefore, it can be
argued that increasing the visa cap for H-1B workers, who will eventually seek permanent
residence status in the United States, without also increasing the limit on employment-based
immigration, will still worsen the backlog on permanent residence applications and thus will not
prevent knowledge-based H-1B workers from returning back to their countries of origin after their
six-year terms are expired if they cannot obtain green cards. Under these facts, increasing the H1B visa cap alone will not likely solve the off-shoring problem. See also Scott Duke Harris, Now
Playing in Immigration Politics, the ‘Reverse Brain Drain’, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 22,
2007 (“The tight cap on permanent visas may force entrepreneurs back home to create rival
companies in China, India and elsewhere. To avoid the possibility of a ‘reverse brain drain,’ they
urged immigration reform to allow skilled immigrants to stay, thus protecting the U.S. competitive
advantage.”).
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practices and prepared to conduct business on global terms.” 203 Thus, U.S.trained talent returns to its home countries where U.S. companies have
established operations for cheaper wages and less overhead. 204
C. THE LOW CAP ON H-1B VISAS HURTS HIRING PRACTICES OF
U.S. COMPANIES
The impact of the low visa cap has been felt by large and small
companies alike. Companies argue that the current cap “considerably
hampers . . . hiring practices.” 205 Google, whose co-founder Sergey Brin
came from the Soviet Union as a young boy, 206 reported that in 2007 the
low H-1B cap “prevented more than 70 candidates from receiving H-1B
visas. 207 Further, Google’s Executive Vice President of People Operations,
Lazlo Bock, testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Immigration in June 2007 that failing to increase the visa cap could be
disastrous for the U.S. economy because, “unfortunately, many . . . valued
employees become frustrated with the inefficiencies in the immigration
system, give up because of the up to five-year waits, and either move home
or seek employment in more welcoming countries, countries that are direct
economic competitors to the United States.” 208 Even Bill Gates reported
that “the visa pinch is hurting [Microsoft’s] ability to complete new
projects.” 209 Smaller institutions are also affected by the cap. For example,
Oklahoma State University reported in 2007 that 223 of its faculty and staff
(more than 10% of the school’s total) were in the United States on H-1B
visas and that “if [they] are going to do the best research and development,
[they] need to have the best and brightest minds.” 210 Thus, if Congress
refuses to increase or eliminate the cap, the frustration of U.S. IT companies
will continue, leading to higher American job losses due to off-shoring, and
the IT sector of the economy will continue to be stifled. Therefore,
Congress should take action towards rectifying these issues.

203. Yang, supra note 51, at 154.
204. Id. (“The combination of capability and lower costs makes off-shoring attractive for U.S.

corporations.”).
205. Colleen Taylor, Google Puts Weight Behind H-1B Visa Reform, ELECTRONIC NEWS, June
11, 2007.
206. Pear, supra note 1, at 1.
207. Taylor, supra note 205.
208. Id.
209. Allan Murray, High-Tech Titans Unite on Lifting Visa Caps, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2006,
at A2 (quoting Bill Gates, “We have product meetings where someone will say: ‘This is when it
will get done with immigration changes, and this is when it will get done without.’”).
210. Editorial, Minds Field; Expansion of Visa Program Needed, OKLAHOMAN, July 10, 2007
at 6A.
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VI. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM: PROPOSED REFORMS TO
THE H-1B CATEGORY
Any reforms implemented by Congress to the H-1B category should
focus on meeting the goals of the statute, i.e. bringing the best and brightest
minds to the United States, preventing displacement of U.S. workers,
providing U.S. employers with adequately trained employees, and
protecting H-1B workers from labor abuses. Possible reforms to the H-1B
category include eliminating the cap entirely and, instead, setting up a
sliding scale limiting the number of H-1B workers a company may hire
based on the percentage of employees at the company; continuing to offer
the option of permanent residency to H-1B workers, making LCA
applications readily available to the public; and imposing stricter penalties
for labor or fraud violations. These proposed reforms are discussed more
fully below.
A. ELIMINATE THE CAP ENTIRELY
Since the H-1B program was designed to allow the United States to
remain at the forefront of the global economy, “the program ought to
maximize its potential economic benefits by increasing its efficiency and
flexibility, the ability to easily adapt to the fast changing global
economy.” 211 Arbitrary caps do not promote efficiency and flexibility, but
rather hinder American companies in the “unpredictable, fast-paced, and
fiercely competitive global high-tech labor markets of the twenty-first
century.” 212 The amount of H-1B visas issued each year should either be
controlled by the labor market 213 or by percentage limits, rather than strict
numerical caps. Regarding the labor market as the determining factor for H1Bs, proponents note that in 2002 and 2003 the labor market controlled the
demand for H-1B visas. 214 In both of those years, the H-1B cap was set at
195,000; 215 however, fewer than 80,000 visas were issued in either of those
years, leaving 230,000 H-1B visas unused. 216 Thus, employers “did not hire
211. Hahm, supra note 31, at 1692.
212. Id. at 1679 (citing Gabrielle M. Buckley, Immigration and Nationality, 32 INT’L LAW. 471,

484 (1998) (noting that the 65,000 cap was “randomly chosen without regard to American
business’ need for or actual use of these visas.”).
213. The idea of allowing the labor market to control the H-1B cap was first introduced by Jung
S. Hahm in his note for the Cornell Law Review in 2000. Mr. Hahm based his ideas on Professor
Howard Chang’s free trade approach to immigration policy which can be found at Howard F.
Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and Optimal Immigration
Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1997). See Hahm, supra note 31, at 1695. See also Review and
Outlook, supra note 135 (“Congress would be better off removing the cap altogether and letting
the market decide.”).
214. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 4.
215. American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-313,
114 Stat. 1251, 2000 Enacted S. 2045, 106 Enacted S. 2045 (Oct. 17, 2000) at 102 (amending 8
U.S.C. 1184(g)(1)(A)).
216. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 4.
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more H-1Bs just because the cap was higher.” 217 Instead, employers
requested H-1B employees according to their need.
A sliding scale percentage may work equally as well. For example,
Congress should limit H-1Bs for small companies (10−25 employees) to
30% of their employees; for medium employers (25−200 employees) to
15%; and for large employers (201−1000+ employees) to 5%. This will
effectively eliminate body shopping and the inflexible deadline of April 1
for H-1B applications. It will also protect U.S. workers from displacement.
Both the labor market determinate and the sliding scale will also allow the
United States to retain valuable intellectual capital by allowing foreign
students to remain in the United States after graduation and by allowing
U.S. companies facing a labor shortage to recruit foreign employees. Either
method will also appease companies’ hiring needs, preventing many U.S.
companies from moving offshore.
B. DO NOT TAKE AWAY OPPORTUNITIES FOR PERMANENT
RESIDENCY FOR H-1B WORKERS
As mentioned in Part III, dual intent allows workers in the United
States on nonimmigrant visas, such as the H-1B, to apply for permanent
resident status while in the United States. 218 If awarded permanent resident
status, employees and their families are able to stay in the United States
indefinitely. 219 One of the main goals of U.S. immigration and the H-1B
category is to bring the best and brightest to the United States. If these
employees are forced to leave after their six-year stay is completed, the
immigration purpose is defeated and the United States not only deprives
itself of valuable brain power, but also allows other countries to compete
with the U.S. economy. Therefore, Congress should not eliminate the dual
intent option for H-1B workers.
C. PUBLISH LCA APPLICATIONS
LCA applications should be published on the DOL website, in a manner
similar to job openings on employment websites. Currently, employers are
required to post their LCAs in two or more conspicuous locations at each
place of employment where any H-1B employee will be employed for thirty
days. 220 This requirement is inadequate. The DOL already has the capability

217. Id.
218. Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 815.
219. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. CITIZENSHIP

AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES: Now that You are a Permanent Resident, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/
menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=fe17e6b0eb13d010VgnVCM100000
48f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=4f719c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD.
220. 20 CFR 655.734(a)(1)(ii)(A) (2009).
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to publish LCA applications on its website. 221 An automatic electronic
posting requires minimal administrative cost and can be done efficiently
with little cost to the government. 222 Posting LCAs on the DOL website will
allow more U.S. workers to discover available job opportunities. If the
burden of recruiting U.S. workers is one of the main reasons that U.S.
companies hire foreign workers instead of U.S. workers, 223 published LCA
applications will bring U.S. workers directly to employers, eliminating the
recruitment need and expense for employers.
In addition to advertising job openings, published LCAs will allow the
public to monitor companies that submit a high number of LCAs. If a
company’s hiring practices are disclosed, it will pay more attention to the
number of H-1B applications it submits, and it will have to answer to the
public’s scrutiny, curbing the need for government regulation. 224
D. IMPLEMENT STRICTER PENALTIES FOR ABUSE
As a further check on U.S. employers and body-shopping agencies, the
government should create stricter penalties, including criminal penalties, for
willfully providing false information on LCA applications. Criminal
penalties for fraud will work in conjunction with the publicly available
LCAs mentioned above. Employees and the public can compare the
information reported on LCAs to the actual practices of employers. If there
are serious and fraudulent discrepancies, the public will report such
discrepancies to the authorities.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The expiration of the 2008 cap on the first day of the application
window is clear evidence that the current cap of 65,000 is inadequate for the
current U.S. labor market. Furthermore, the arbitrary cap itself is damaging
to U.S. companies seeking the world’s best talent and the brightest
employees. Not only does the cap threaten the United States’ position as the
world’s leading possessor of intellectual capital, it also threatens U.S. jobs
and continued growth of the U.S. labor market, especially in the IT
industry. Congress should reform the H-1B category as soon as possible by
taking into consideration the issues and recommendations discussed herein.
In light of the current economic crisis in the United States and throughout
the rest of the world, the U.S. economy is at risk of falling behind other
nations and allowing important ideas to fall into the wrong hands.
221. See Welcome to the Foreign Labor Certification LCA Online System,
http://www.lca.doleta.gov/eta_start.cfm?actiontype=home&CFID=2094816&CFTOKEN=195392
36.
222. Examples of electronic posting websites include Monster.com, Craig’s List and online
newspaper classifieds.
223. Kirby, supra note 123, at B1.
224. O’Brien, supra note 6.
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Congress’s first priority should be to secure valuable intellectual capital and
keep it within the United States. Eliminating or at least increasing the H-1B
visa cap will be one important step in the right direction.
Courtney L. Cromwell *
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